A ttributing human behaviours and characteristics to genetic causes can influence how people perceive and evaluate those behaviours and characteristics 1 . However, the literature suggests that the effects of genetic explanations may depend, in part, on what sort of behaviours or characteristics are being explained 2 . For stigmatized health conditions, genetic attributions are consistently linked to decreased perceptions of affected individuals as blameworthy for their disease or disability [3] [4] [5] . That is, conceptualizing conditions such as obesity and mental disorders as stemming from genetic and other biological causes can reduce the extent to which individuals are held responsible for them [3] [4] [5] . This may be because attributing a person's behaviour to genetic causes can cast him or her as having diminished self-control, insofar as genetic explanations can be interpreted as implying that someone's actions are determined rather than free 6, 7 . Substantial evidence suggests that people view agency and the freedom to do otherwise as a prerequisite to holding others responsible for their behaviour, on the presumption that people can only be blamed for intentional actions 8, 9 . However, the results have not been as straightforward in studies assessing the application of this logic to judgements about antisocial behaviours, such as crime and other types of wrongdoing. At first glance, this is surprising. In a growing number of countries, purported evidence for the presence of biological predispositions toward antisocial behaviour has been introduced on behalf of defendants in pursuit of reduced sentences [10] [11] [12] . But while some evidence has suggested that biomedical (including genetic) explanations for criminal behaviour can lead defendants to be seen as less responsible for their misdeeds, and therefore treated more leniently 13 , the findings have been quite mixed 14 . Indeed, in most cases genetic explanations for criminal and other antisocial behaviour have been found to have no effect on decisions about how to punish criminals and wrongdoers [15] [16] [17] [18] . Why might genetic explanations fail to consistently reduce blame for antisocial behaviour? One answer to this question that has been posited in the literature rests on the notion that morality is dyadic in nature, with people perceived as either moral agents (capable of doing good or evil) or as moral patients (recipients of good or evil) 19 . It has been suggested that an inverse relationship exists between the two perceptions-a phenomenon known as moral typecasting 20 . According to this formulation, blame can be reduced by portraying a perpetrator as a victim of harm, that is, as a moral patient rather than a moral agent 21 . Unlike some environmental explanations for misconduct, which can compellingly portray the wrongdoer as a victim of harm (such as childhood trauma or abuse), recent research has suggested that genetic explanations are not perceived as casting a perpetrator as a victim, or moral patient 19 . These findings may explain why genetic explanations do not always reduce perceptions of blame.
A ttributing human behaviours and characteristics to genetic causes can influence how people perceive and evaluate those behaviours and characteristics 1 . However, the literature suggests that the effects of genetic explanations may depend, in part, on what sort of behaviours or characteristics are being explained 2 . For stigmatized health conditions, genetic attributions are consistently linked to decreased perceptions of affected individuals as blameworthy for their disease or disability [3] [4] [5] . That is, conceptualizing conditions such as obesity and mental disorders as stemming from genetic and other biological causes can reduce the extent to which individuals are held responsible for them [3] [4] [5] . This may be because attributing a person's behaviour to genetic causes can cast him or her as having diminished self-control, insofar as genetic explanations can be interpreted as implying that someone's actions are determined rather than free 6, 7 . Substantial evidence suggests that people view agency and the freedom to do otherwise as a prerequisite to holding others responsible for their behaviour, on the presumption that people can only be blamed for intentional actions 8, 9 . However, the results have not been as straightforward in studies assessing the application of this logic to judgements about antisocial behaviours, such as crime and other types of wrongdoing. At first glance, this is surprising. In a growing number of countries, purported evidence for the presence of biological predispositions toward antisocial behaviour has been introduced on behalf of defendants in pursuit of reduced sentences [10] [11] [12] . But while some evidence has suggested that biomedical (including genetic) explanations for criminal behaviour can lead defendants to be seen as less responsible for their misdeeds, and therefore treated more leniently 13 , the findings have been quite mixed 14 . Indeed, in most cases genetic explanations for criminal and other antisocial behaviour have been found to have no effect on decisions about how to punish criminals and wrongdoers [15] [16] [17] [18] . Why might genetic explanations fail to consistently reduce blame for antisocial behaviour? One answer to this question that has been posited in the literature rests on the notion that morality is dyadic in nature, with people perceived as either moral agents (capable of doing good or evil) or as moral patients (recipients of good or evil) 19 . It has been suggested that an inverse relationship exists between the two perceptions-a phenomenon known as moral typecasting 20 . According to this formulation, blame can be reduced by portraying a perpetrator as a victim of harm, that is, as a moral patient rather than a moral agent 21 . Unlike some environmental explanations for misconduct, which can compellingly portray the wrongdoer as a victim of harm (such as childhood trauma or abuse), recent research has suggested that genetic explanations are not perceived as casting a perpetrator as a victim, or moral patient 19 . These findings may explain why genetic explanations do not always reduce perceptions of blame.
Here we explore another possible reason why genetic explanations might be relatively ineffective at reducing perceptions of blame for antisocial behaviour. We do so by investigating whether people are less open to adopting genetic explanations for some types of behaviour than for others. In particular, we explore the question of whether people are differentially receptive to genetic explanations for bad acts (operationalized here as antisocial behaviours) versus good acts (prosocial behaviours). If people are more resistant to believing genetic explanations for wrongdoing in the first place, such an asymmetry could illuminate why genetic explanations for misdeeds generally fail to secure more lenient treatment for wrongdoers-such explanations are simply rejected out of hand before decisions about desert are made.
Wide-ranging evidence has shown that the evaluative valence of an event-that is, whether it is seen as good or bad-affects how and to what extent people will reason about its causes: negative events tend to elicit more causal reasoning than positive ones 22, 23 . Additionally, there is ample evidence that people's willingness to accept genetic and other biological explanations for the behaviours and characteristics of others often depends on factors beyond the intrinsic quality of the explanations themselves, including aspects of the perceivers' own social identities and whether they view the genetic explanations as consistent with their preexisting social and political commitments [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Although to our Genetic explanations of human behaviour are increasingly common. While genetic attributions for behaviour are often considered relevant for assessing blameworthiness, it has not yet been established whether judgements about blameworthiness can themselves impact genetic attributions. Across six studies, participants read about individuals engaging in prosocial or antisocial behaviour, and rated the extent to which they believed that genetics played a role in causing the behaviour. Antisocial behaviour was consistently rated as less genetically influenced than prosocial behaviour. This was true regardless of whether genetic explanations were explicitly provided or refuted. Mediation analyses suggested that this asymmetry may stem from people's motivating desire to hold wrongdoers responsible for their actions. These findings suggest that those who seek to study or make use of genetic explanations' influence on evaluations of, for example, antisocial behaviour should consider whether such explanations are accepted in the first place, given the possibility of motivated causal reasoning.
knowledge no research has examined how the moral valence of a behaviour affects its likelihood of being attributed to genetic causes, a variety of studies have uncovered other kinds of intuitions and judgements about behaviour that can be influenced significantly by moral considerations [29] [30] [31] . One well-established example is that people attribute more agency, intentionality and control to actions that have negative consequences than to those with positive consequences [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] . Relatedly, people are more inclined to attribute negative events (rather than positive events) to the agency of others 37 . Moreover, learning about or experiencing the immoral behaviour of others causes people to endorse greater belief in free will, apparently in an effort to justify holding wrongdoers responsible for their actions 38 . This may be an example of 'blame validation processing' , which refers to a 'proclivity to favour blame versus nonblame explanations for harmful events and to de-emphasize mitigating circumstances' 39 . In light of lay assumptions that genetic explanations for a behaviour render it less under the actor's control 6, 7 , genetic attributions may be an example of a 'nonblame explanation' that, according to the 'blame validation' view, would tend to be disfavoured in the case of antisocial acts 39 .
Another explanation that has been offered for asymmetries in intuitions about morally good versus morally bad behaviours is the notion that people generally assume that "deep inside every individual there is a 'true self ' calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous" 40 . In other words, people generally assume that the essence of every person is inherently good 41 . Because DNA is often seen as representing the essence of a person 1 , this 'true self ' view might predict that people would be resistant to the idea of genes causing antisocial behaviour, because this would imply that a person could have a 'bad essence' , whereas the true self is assumed by default to be morally good.
Based on the above-described motivations predicted by both the 'true self ' and 'blame validation' views, we hypothesized that people would more readily attribute prosocial (good) behaviour to genetic causes than they would antisocial (bad) behaviour. We reasoned that these motivations could help explain the often-reported but counterintuitive lack of effect of genetic attributions for wrongdoing. The present research used six vignette experiments to test this hypothesis. Study one asked people to estimate the causal role of genes in two instances of either prosocial or antisocial behaviours. Study two tested whether differences in genetic attributions for prosocial and antisocial behaviours could be eliminated by giving participants explicit information about the role (or lack thereof) of genes in causing the behaviours described. Study three expanded on the findings of studies one and two by using a broader range of prosocial and antisocial behaviours, as well as by providing different sorts of explanations regarding the role of genes in causing them. Study four tested possible mediators of the asymmetry in genetic attributions for anti-and prosocial behaviour. Study five examined whether the asymmetry in genetic attributions between prosocial and antisocial actions would occur in response to descriptions of general patterns of behaviour, rather than only in response to potentially idiosyncratic accounts of specific behaviours. Finally, study six examined whether such an asymmetry would emerge when the antisocial behaviours described in the experimental stimuli were violent crimes, such as those judged in the courtrooms where genetic evidence is increasingly brought to bear.
results

Study one.
We began by examining whether people are differentially likely to perceive genetic causes for prosocial versus antisocial behaviours. In study one, participants (see Methods) were randomly assigned to either a prosocial condition (n = 126) or an antisocial condition (n = 125). They were presented with two vignettes (featuring protagonists named 'Jane' and 'Tom') in a randomized order. A sentence describing how each protagonist responded to the situation was systematically varied to depict either prosocial behaviour in both vignettes (prosocial condition) or antisocial behaviour in both vignettes (antisocial condition) ( Table 1) . Participants rated their genetic attributions for each protagonist's behaviour (see Methods for more detail). We analysed these genetic attribution ratings using a univariate ANOVA with condition (prosocial versus antisocial) as a between-subjects factor and vignette as a within-subjects factor (Fig. 1a) . The key finding was a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 249) = 19.47, P < 0.001, d = 0.56, 95% confidence interval (CI) = (0.37, 0.75): participants gave significantly higher genetic attribution ratings for prosocial behaviour (M = 3.15, 95% CI = (2.88, 3.43), SD = 1.58) than for antisocial behaviour (M = 2.29, 95% CI = (2.02, 2.56), SD = 1.52). There was also a main effect of vignette, F(1, 249) = 10.11, P = 0.002, d rm = 0.21, 95% CI = (0.03, 0.38), which emerged because genetic attributions were stronger on average for Tom's behaviour (M = 2.83, 95% CI = (2.62, 3.04), SD = 1.72) than for Jane's behaviour (M = 2.62, 95% CI = (2.42, 2.83), SD = 1.65). However, there was no significant vignette × condition interaction, F(1, 249) = 0.13, P = 0.723, meaning that the effect of condition did not significantly differ across the two vignettes. The data from study one are presented as a box-andwhisker plot in Supplementary Fig. 1 .
Study two.
Having demonstrated a difference in genetic attributions for prosocial and antisocial behaviours in study one, we were interested in exploring whether this difference could be eliminated by supplying participants with information about the role (or lack thereof) of genes in causing the behaviours described. Thus, we used the same vignettes as in study one, but in study two we varied whether the protagonist had been found to be genetically predisposed to the type of behaviour exhibited (genetic explanation, n = 126) or to lack such a genetic predisposition (no genetic explanation, n = 124) (see Methods and Table 2 ). Participants' genetic attribution ratings (Fig. 1b) were again analysed using a univariate ANOVA, this time with two between-subjects factorscondition (prosocial versus antisocial) and explanation (genetic explanation versus no genetic explanation)-and one within-subjects factor (vignette: Jane versus Tom). As in study one, findings were consistent with our hypothesis: participants in the prosocial condition provided higher genetic attribution ratings (M = 2.55, 95% CI = (2.29, 2.82), SD = 1.48) than did participants in the antisocial condition (M = 2.18, 95% CI = (1.93, 2.44), SD = 1.45), F(1, 246) = 4.48, P = 0.035, d = 0.25, 95% CI = (0.07, 0.43). There was also a significant main effect of explanation, F(1, 246) = 50.20, P < 0.001, d = 0.90, 95% CI = (0.73, 1.06): participants exposed to the genetic explanation provided stronger genetic attribution ratings (M = 2.96, 95% CI = (2.69, 3.24), SD = 1.57) than those exposed to no genetic explanation (M = 1.76, 95% CI = (1.57, 1,95), SD = 1.08). However, there was no significant explanation × condition interaction, F(1, 246) = 0.21, P = 0.651, meaning that the type of explanatory information provided did not significantly moderate the asymmetry in genetic attributions between prosocial and antisocial behaviour. There was also no significant main effect of vignette, F(1, 246) = 1.59, P = 0.209, and no significant vignette × condition (F(1, 246) = 2.71, P = 0.101), vignette × explanation (F(1, 246) = 0.04, P = 0.846), or vignette × condition × explanation (F(1, 246) = 1.27, P = 0.261) interactions. The data from study two are presented as a box-and-whisker plot in Supplementary Fig. 2 .
Study three.
To examine the boundary conditions of the effects documented in studies one and two, study three used vignettes describing a wider range of behaviours and provided participants with more potent information about the role (or lack thereof) of genes in the behaviours described. Participants (see Methods) read about a woman named Jane encountering one of six situations and behaving in either an antisocial or prosocial manner, depending on the condition to which they had been assigned (see 'Study three' , 'Stimuli and procedures' in Methods for more detail). Participants were also randomly assigned either to receive a genetic explanation (designed to be more forceful and compelling than the one used in study two, as described in Methods) or no genetic explanation of Jane's behaviour. We analysed genetic attributions for Jane's behaviour using a 6 (situation) × 2 (condition: antisocial versus prosocial) × 2 (explanation: genetic explanation versus no genetic explanation) ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect of condition, with prosocial behaviour (n = 305, M = 3.31, 95% CI = (3.09, 3.53), SD = 1.96) attributed significantly more strongly to genetic causes than was antisocial behaviour (n = 304, M = 3.04, 95% CI = (2.82, 3.25), SD = 1.92), F(1, 585) = 5.71, P = 0.017, d = 0.14, 95% CI = (−0.01, 0.29) (Fig. 2a) . There was also a significant main effect of explanation, F(1, 585) = 573.27, P < 0.001, d = 1.94, 95% CI = (1.83, 2.05); again, the genetic explanation yielded significantly greater genetic attributions (n = 305, M = 4.52, 95% CI = (4.35, 4.69), SD = 1.54) than the lack of a genetic explanation (n = 304, M = 1.82, 95% CI = (1.68, 1.96), SD = 1.23). However, there was no main effect of situation, F(5, 585) = 0.84, P = 0.519, and there were no significant explanation × condition (F(1, 585) = 0.69, P = 0.408), condition × situation (F(5, 585) = 1.16, P = 0.330), explanation × situation (F(5, 585) = 1.41, P = 0.218), or situation × condition × explanation (F(5, 585) = 0.42, P = 0.832) interactions, meaning that the effect of condition (prosocial or antisocial) was not significantly moderated by the situation or explanation to which a participant was assigned. The data from study three are presented as a box-andwhisker plot in Supplementary Fig. 3 .
Study four. In order to evaluate the 'blame validation' and 'true self ' accounts described earlier as potential explanations for the findings of studies one to three, study four (n = 608; see Methods, 'Study four' , 'Participants') examined two psychological phenomena that could possibly be mediating people's tendency to endorse genetic explanations less readily for antisocial behaviour than for prosocial behaviour. In particular, we tested whether the difference in genetic attributions for antisocial and prosocial behaviour was consistent with mediation by differences in ascriptions of responsibility (as would be predicted by the 'blame validation' view) and/or by differences in judgements of the extent to which the behaviour reflected who the actor truly was (as would be predicted by the 'true self ' In study two, this was true regardless of whether or not participants were given a genetic explanation for the behaviour they read about. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error (SE).
view). Study four was identical to study three, except that there was no manipulation of the presence or absence of a genetic explanation, and participants rated Jane's level of responsibility for behaviour and the extent to which her behaviour reflected 'who she truly is, ' in addition to rating their genetic attributions (see Methods, 'Study four' , 'Stimuli and procedures'). We initially analysed the data from study four using a 6 (situation) × 2 (condition: antisocial versus prosocial) ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of condition on genetic attribution ratings, replicating the results of studies one to three: genetic attributions were significantly weaker for antisocial behaviour (M = 3.00, 95% CI = (2.82, 3.18), SD = 1.56) than for prosocial behaviour (M = 3.72, 95% CI = (3.54, 3.90), SD = 1.63), F(1, 596) = 31.02, P < 0.001, d = 0.45, 95% CI = (0.33, 0.58) (Fig. 2b ). There was no significant effect of situation, F(5, 596) = 1.04, P = 0.394, and no significant situation × condition interaction, F(5, 596) = 0.38, P = 0.862, meaning that the asymmetry in genetic attributions did not differ significantly between vignette versions. There was also a significant effect of condition on responsibility ratings; participants rated Jane as more responsible for antisocial Unlike for genetic attribution and responsibility ratings, there was no significant difference in 'true self ' ratings between the antisocial (M = 6.28, 95% CI = (6.17, 6.39), SD = 0.99) and prosocial (M = 6.35, 95% CI = (6.26, 6.45), SD = 0.85) conditions, F(1, 596) = 1.03, P = 0.31. Once again, there was no significant effect of situation, F(5, 596) = 1.60, P = 0.158, and no significant situation × condition interaction, F(5, 596) = 1.12, P = 0.349.
We evaluated the two mediation hypotheses using the PROCESS procedure (version 3.2) for SPSS with 5,000 bootstrap samples 42 . Figure 3 illustrates the results of this analysis. In particular, there was a significant indirect effect of condition on genetic attributions through responsibility ratings (unstandardized B = 0.06, 95% percentile bootstrap CI (0.01, 0.11)), consistent with the notion that In study three, this was true regardless of whether or not participants were given a genetic explanation for the behaviour they read about. Error bars represent ± 1 SE.
participants' motivation to hold Jane responsible for harmful behaviour mediated their tendency to rate her behaviour as less genetically influenced when she acted antisocially than when she acted prosocially. However, the indirect effect through 'true self ' ratings was not significant (unstandardized B < 0.0001, 95% percentile bootstrap CI (−0.02, 0.02)), suggesting that the extent to which participants considered Jane's pattern of behaviour to reflect who she truly was did not mediate their differential willingness to make genetic attributions for her prosocial and antisocial behaviour. The data from study four are presented as a box-and-whisker plot in Supplementary Fig. 4 .
Study five. Study five investigated whether the same asymmetry found in the earlier studies for prosocial and antisocial behaviours would occur in response to broad descriptions of a person's behaviour, rather than just potentially idiosyncratic vignettes describing specific actions. This approach also allowed us to attain a more careful degree of experimental control, by writing the prosocial and antisocial versions of the stimuli to more closely parallel each other. Participants were randomly assigned to be told that Jane was generally either 'kind, generous, and caring' (prosocial condition) or 'mean, selfish, and uncaring' (antisocial condition) (see Methods for more detail). As in studies one to four, participants in the antisocial condition provided significantly lower genetic attribution ratings for Jane's tendencies (M = 2.90, 95% CI = (2.64, 3.16), SD = 1.49) than did those in the prosocial condition (M = 3.61, 95% CI = (3.36, 3.85), SD = 1.41), t(258) = 3.93, P < 0.001, d = 0.49, 95% CI = (0.32, 0.67). Notably, the mean of 3.61 in the prosocial condition neared the scale midpoint of 4, which may suggest that, in general, people do not consider genetic attributions to be implausible as explanations for prosocial behaviour. By contrast, the mean in the antisocial condition was 2.90, well below the midpoint and significantly lower than for the prosocial condition.
Study six. The results of studies one to five consistently found an asymmetry in which people were less willing to endorse genetic causes for antisocial (as opposed to prosocial) behaviour. Study six aimed to investigate whether this asymmetry would emerge when the antisocial behaviours that participants were judging involved serious criminal acts. This is an important question because much of the previous research that has observed no significant effects of genetic explanations on the punishment deemed appropriate for wrongdoing focused on criminal behaviour [15] [16] [17] [18] . The courtroom is also the most prominent real-life circumstance in which people are asked to evaluate the relevance of genetic causes to responsibility and desert. If people are relatively unwilling to ascribe criminal behaviour to genetic causes, this could provide a plausible account of why genetic explanations often do not seem to have significant effects on punishment in such contexts. However, while studies one to five suggest that people may be relatively unwilling to attribute antisocial behaviour in general to genetic causes, most of the actions used as examples of antisocial behaviour in these studies did not rise to the level of serious criminality, leaving the real-world applicability of the findings (for example, to criminal cases) somewhat in doubt. Thus, study six used violent crimes for its examples of After reading one of six vignettes describing a woman named Jane engaging in either prosocial or antisocial behaviour, participants rated how much of a role they believed genetics had played in causing Jane's behaviour, on a scale from '1 (No role or a very minor role)' to '7 (A very major role).' They also rated how responsible they considered Jane to be for her behaviour and provide a 'true self' rating of the extent to which Jane's behaviour reflected 'who she truly is' -both rated on a scale from '1 (Not at all)' to '7 (Very much).' Mediation models were tested using the PROCESS procedure (version 3.2) for SPSS with 5,000 bootstrap samples 42 . There was a significant indirect effect of condition on genetic attributions through responsibility ratings, but the indirect effect through 'true self' ratings was not significant. Regression coefficients are unstandardized.
antisocial behaviour, instead of the milder, less extreme examples of antisocial behaviour used in studies one to five.
Participants were randomly assigned to read about one of two characters, Michael or Nick, either rescuing another person from being the victim of a violent crime (prosocial condition), or committing a violent crime (criminal condition) (see Methods for more detail). Replicating the asymmetry observed in studies one to five, participants in the criminal condition provided significantly lower genetic attribution ratings for the behaviour they read about (M = 3.00, 95% CI = (2.80, 3.20 There was also a significant main effect of character (Michael versus Nick), F(1, 682) = 4.13, P = 0.043, d = 0.15, 95% CI = (0.003, 0.30). This effect emerged because overall, across the different types of behaviour (criminal and prosocial), participants provided greater genetic attributions for Michael's behaviour (n = 343, M = 3.35, 95% CI = (3.15, 3.55), SD = 1.88) than for Nick's (n = 343, M = 3.05, 95% CI = (2.84, 3.27), SD = 2.01). However, there was no significant character × behaviour interaction (F(1, 682) = 1.73, P = 0.189), meaning that the effect of behaviour (criminal versus prosocial) did not differ significantly depending on the character to which a participant was assigned.
Discussion
The primary finding of the present research is that people make weaker genetic attributions for antisocial behaviour than for prosocial behaviour. Although the magnitude of this effect generally fell in the small-to-medium range (by conventional effect-size definitions), it was replicated across six studies using a range of stimuli that described a variety of prosocial and antisocial behaviours. The asymmetry was present when participants were only given descriptions of behaviour and asked to rate how much of a role genetics played in causing it, without being told anything about the actor's genetic predisposition; and it persisted even when participants were told explicitly whether the individual in question was genetically predisposed to the type of behaviour exhibited, suggesting that people may remain relatively reluctant to accept even explicit ascriptions of antisocial behaviour to genetics. The asymmetry was present across a variety of prosocial and antisocial behaviours, including when the antisocial behaviours in question were violent and criminal, suggesting a degree of generalizability. The relative resistance to genetic explanations for antisocial behaviours demonstrated across these studies might help to explain findings from previous studies that indicate that genetic evidence often fails to influence the punishments deemed appropriate for criminal wrongdoing [15] [16] [17] [18] . In the present study, the asymmetry was not moderated statistically by which vignette a participant viewed, despite our use of a wide range of stimuli across the different studies. Moreover, we observed this asymmetry when participants were only provided with general characterizations of a person's broad tendencies that used careful experimental control to maximize the parallels between the prosocial and antisocial stimuli, and were not told about any specific behaviours.
The present research also considered two possible explanations for the observed asymmetry. The results of our mediation analyses in study four were consistent with the 'blame validation' account, and not with the 'true self ' account. The blame validation view would suggest that people see genetic explanations as deflecting moral responsibility for behaviour, and therefore disfavour them in the case of antisocial behaviour, out of a desire to maintain the ability to assign blame. Our data suggest that this sort of motivation for rejecting genetic explanations for antisocial behaviour is more likely than one predicated on resistance to the notion that people's genetic 'essences' or true selves could ever predispose them towards morally bad behaviour. However, the indirect effect through which responsibility ratings mediated the difference (between prosocial and antisocial behaviour) in genetic attributions was small, suggesting that other mediators are also in play. Moreover, the variable we used to assess participants' motivation to hold people responsible for their behaviour simply asked participants to rate how responsible they judged people to be, rather than assessing blame or desire to punish per se. We chose to use the item we did because it allowed us to use the same measure for both prosocial and antisocial behaviour, but other measures could clarify the question further (see Supplementary Note 1 for further discussion). Additionally, our mediation analyses were correlational, and we did not explicitly manipulate blame, so our data's support for the blame validation account is only preliminary. Elucidating a specific mechanistic account of why people reject genetic explanations in some situations more than others was not our primary goal, but future research could examine the mechanisms behind the asymmetry with different methods to further explore this intriguing question.
Our analyses suggest that participants' 'true self ' ratings in study four did not significantly mediate their lesser willingness to attribute antisocial behaviour to genetic causes (as compared to prosocial behaviour), but it is notable that 'true self ' ratings tended to be quite high for both types of behaviour (with means above six on a seven-point scale). This may be seen as somewhat surprising in light of previous research suggesting that people tend to assume that the true self is morally virtuous 41 . Perhaps participants interpreted the rating scale differently depending on the type of behaviour they read about. That is, participants in the prosocial condition may have provided high ratings because prosocial behaviour seemed consistent with the notion of a morally virtuous true self. At the same time, those in the antisocial condition may have considered their high ratings as providing further justification or validation of their responsibility judgements (that is, their ascriptions of blame) by conceptualizing the antisocial behaviour as stemming from the perpetrator's deep-seated nature.
Our findings add to the substantial body of existing evidence suggesting that factors beyond the inherent quality of biological explanations for behaviour can influence people's likelihood of endorsing them [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . The findings have specific real-world implications, particularly for situations in which genetic explanations for antisocial behaviour are deployed strategically, such as when genetic evidence about a defendant is introduced in court as a means of seeking more lenient sentencing. If people are generally resistant to genetic explanations for antisocial behaviour-including crime, as we observed in study six-judges and jurors may be unlikely to be swayed by such evidence. Indeed, this resistance might help to explain why providing genetic explanations for misdeeds often fails to affect judgements about criminal culpability and punishment in Antisocial condition Rather than approaching the man and shaking him by the shoulder to wake him up and make sure that he was OK, Jane took the man's cup of money and left him lying in the parking lot.
Instead of coming to the defense of the younger student, Tom joined in with some taunts of his own.
Prosocial condition Rather than taking the man's cup of money and leaving him lying in the parking lot, Jane approached the man and shook him by the shoulder to wake him up and make sure that he was OK.
Instead of joining in with some taunts of his own, Tom came to the defense of the younger student.
the ways we might expect 14 , as well as the finding that Americans tend to disfavour genetic explanations for violent behaviour, as compared to environmental and choice-based explanations 43 . The present findings may also have implications for other experimental research seeking to measure the impact of genetic explanations for morally significant behaviours on downstream variables, such as ascriptions of blame and praise or judgements about punishment and reward. In particular, any time genetic explanations for undesirable behaviour are found not to have an effect on such downstream variables, particularly in the case of antisocial behaviour 17, 18 , researchers would be wise to consider the possibility that people simply did not accept the genetic explanations in the first place. Studies that attempt to experimentally manipulate people's causal attributions for behaviour through the use of genetic explanations should consider employing 'manipulation checks' to measure whether such explanations are effectively impacting participants' beliefs about the influence of genes, especially in cases of antisocial behaviour.
Our findings raise a number of important questions for future research. First, it is unclear how unique genetic explanations are in being endorsed more strongly in cases of prosocial behaviour than cases of antisocial behaviour. Future research could examine whether a similar pattern would emerge for other kinds of explanations, by assessing what other potential 'nonblame explanations' 39 might be afforded less weight in attempts to explain antisocial (as opposed to prosocial) behaviour. These could include various explanations for behaviour that appear to deflect responsibility away from the actorsuch as attempts to link criminality to early childhood trauma or socioeconomic deprivation, or attributions of antisocial behaviour to neurobiological factors or acquired medical problems 44 . Insofar as genes are viewed as constitutive of human character and behaviour 1 , it may be that they are seen as uniquely or unusually exculpatory, and that causes not associated with people's inner essences would not yield the same asymmetry, or would yield it less strongly. A recent meta-analysis suggests that neurobiological explanations (at least in the context of mental disorders) may not be seen as nonblame explanations to the same extent that genetic explanations are 45 , which would suggest that people would be less resistant to neurobiological explanations of antisocial behaviour. As for environmental explanations, some research suggests that they may reduce blame for wrongdoing more powerfully than genetic explanations-which might suggest that people are less resistant to environmental explanations than to genetic explanations in such cases 19 . However, more research is needed to establish this conclusively. It remains to be definitively determined whether other kinds of explanations for behaviour besides genetic ones, be they environmental or biological, would yield the same kind of asymmetries observed in the present research.
Future research could also examine whether the asymmetry we report here could be observed using other measures of genetic attribution, such as by gauging genetic attributions on a comparative scale that considers genetic explanations as 'one end' of the scale and environmental or psychosocial explanations as the other. All of the present studies used a single measure of genetic attributions that assessed them non-comparatively, which allowed us to assess genetic attributions alone without introducing the possibility of other competing explanations or suggesting to participants that rejecting genetic attributions was akin to embracing another type of attribution. Researchers could also consider using different methods of gauging responsibility/blame and 'true self ' beliefs rather than the scales used in the present research, which have the potential limitation of being single-item measures.
Additionally, future studies could investigate whether certain individual-difference variables might moderate or interact with the asymmetry documented here. For example, individuals with greater dispositional tendencies toward punitiveness (or those who work in the criminal justice system) might be especially resistant to genetic attributions for antisocial behaviour, while perhaps those with expertise in behavioural genetics would show less motivation toward blame validation. Finally, future research could examine whether the asymmetry we observed in the endorsement of genetic explanations is unique to comparisons of prosocial and antisocial behaviour, or whether there is a more general willingness to make genetic attributions for positively valenced phenotypes (for example, physical attractiveness) than for negatively valenced ones (for example, ugliness).
When taken together, our results suggest that people's interpretations and evaluations of findings in behavioural genetics may depend not only on the scientific merit of the evidence, but also on the moral valence of the behaviours in question. This kind of motivated reasoning about empirical information can pose obstacles to scientific literacy 46 , underscoring the importance of identifying It turns out Tom does not carry a combination of genes that can make behaviour like his response during the bullying incident more likely. Fig. 4 | image used in the genetic explanation in study three. When participants of study three read about either prosocial or antisocial behaviour, some were randomly assigned to be given a genetic explanation for the behaviour. This explanation, designed to be more forceful and compelling than the text-only one used in study two, stated, 'Scientists have found that people can have genes that lead them to behave this way.
Here is a graphic that illustrates the area of the genome where these genes are found.' This image, which actually shows polymorphic simple sequence repeat markers from several individuals (with alleles for one marker from one individual circled in red), was then displayed. Image reproduced with permission from ref. 18 , Oxford Univ. Press.
exactly what motivations are affecting intuitions about behavioural genetics and precisely what impact biological explanations are having on people's thinking.
Methods
All procedures for all studies were administered using Qualtrics.com data collection software and were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the New York State Psychiatric Institute, indicating compliance with ethical guidelines. In all studies, participants indicated their informed consent to participate via an online form. Qualtrics settings were used to build random assignment of participants to experimental conditions into the study procedures, and because this process was computerized and participants completed the studies online, performing the data collection blind to condition was not a concern.
Studies one and two. Studies one and two used similar methods.
Participants. In study one, participants were US adults (n = 251, 45.8% male, 54.2% female, age range 19-73 years, M = 34.70 years, SD = 10.31) recruited online using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform 47 , which allows participants to complete short tasks in exchange for payment. Participants who completed the study were provided with a 'completion code, ' which they entered into the MTurk system to receive a $1 payment. The sample size was chosen based on a pilot study using the same methods (n = 100) that yielded a difference in genetic attributions between prosocial and antisocial behaviour with an effect size of d = 0.36, which requires a minimum sample size of 246 to be detected with 80% power. For study two, we recruited a sample of 250 US adults (42.8% male, 57.2% female) using MTurk, based on the same considerations used to determine the sample size for study one (participants in studies two to six were not asked to report their ages; those in studies two to five were recruited and compensated in the same manner as participants in study one).
Stimuli and procedures. The vignettes used for studies one and two were largely identical. One described Tom, a 13-year-old student who happened upon a bullying incident in the hallway of his school; the other described Jane, a 30-yearold woman who came across an unconscious homeless man lying in a parking lot in her neighbourhood. So that all participants would be exposed to mentions of all of the same behaviours, these sentences took the format 'Instead of [prosocial behaviour], Jane/Tom [antisocial behaviour]' in the antisocial condition, and vice versa in the prosocial condition (see Table 1 for text of experimental manipulation). In study one, other than this experimental manipulation, participants in both conditions read identical vignettes. In study two, several sentences were added to the end of each vignette, explaining that the target individual had recently undergone genetic testing, and the final sentence of each vignette (Table 2) was randomly assigned to state either that the individual was genetically predisposed to exhibit the type of behaviour described in the vignette (genetic explanation, n = 126) or lacked such a genetic predisposition (no genetic explanation, n = 124).
In both studies one and two, after reading each vignette, participants were asked, 'How much of a role do you think genetics played in Tom/Jane's behaviour in the story you just read?' and provided their responses on a scale from '1 (No role or a very minor role)' to '7 (A very major role). ' At the end of each study, participants were asked basic demographic questions and were debriefed as to the fictitious nature of the vignettes.
Full stimuli for studies one and two are reproduced in Supplementary Table 1 .
Study three. Participants. Study three used a 6 × 2 × 2 between-subjects design, yielding a total of 24 groups. As such, we calculated that a total sample of at least n= 505 would be required for 80% power to detect an effect with the magnitude of the difference in genetic attributions between prosocial and antisocial behaviour observed in study two. Given that study three used novel stimuli, we reasoned that an even larger sample size might be necessary. Thus, participants in study three were 609 US adults (66.2% female, 33.3% male, 0.5% other gender or no response) recruited via MTurk.
Stimuli and procedures. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of six vignettes, each of which described a woman named Jane finding herself in one of six different situations. Depending on the condition (that is, prosocial or antisocial) to which they had been assigned, participants read about Jane acting either prosocially or antisocially in their assigned situation. Here, participants were not told about the behaviour that Jane did not perform (as they were in studies one and two), because we wished to rule out the possibility that the asymmetry would only emerge when both behaviours were mentioned and the individual explicitly was said to have engaged in one but not the other. All participants were told that the behaviour they had read about was 'consistent with how Jane usually behaves. ' This information was included because we reasoned that participants might have difficulty attributing one specific behaviour to Jane's genetic makeup, but might find a genetic explanation for Jane's actions more plausible if they were said to be part of a consistent pattern of behaviour.
Participants were further randomly assigned either to receive a genetic explanation or no genetic explanation of Jane's behaviour. The genetic explanation used in study three was intended to be more forceful and compelling than the one used in study two. To this end, the genetic explanation included an image (Fig. 4) , used in previous research 18 , purporting to illustrate the location in the genome of genes that had been shown to cause the type of behaviour exhibited by Jane. It also stated, ' According to recent testing, Jane has these genes. In other words, Jane's genetic makeup-the DNA that she inherited from her parents-leads her to behave the way she does in situations like these. ' Participants who were assigned to receive no genetic explanation, by contrast, were not shown this image and were told, ' According to recent testing, Jane does not have any genes that are known to lead people to behave this way. In other words, there is no evidence that Jane's genetic makeup-the DNA that she inherited from her parents-leads her to behave the way she does in situations like these. ' After reading their assigned vignette and explanation, participants were asked, 'How much of a role do you think genetics have played in Jane's patterns of behaviour that you just read about?' and provided their responses on the same scale used in studies one and two. See Supplementary Tables 2 and 3 for the full stimuli used in study three.
Study four. For study four (which explored mediation models), although it had fewer conditions than study three (because it did not involve randomly assigning participants to a genetic or no genetic explanation), we wished to be conservative with our sample size because we did not have a clear a priori estimate of effect size for our measures of the potential mediator variables. Therefore, we again recruited participants via MTurk, aiming to obtain a sample similar in size to the one used for study three.
Participants. Participants were 608 US adults (39.1% male, 60.5% female, 0.4% other gender or preferring not to answer).
Stimuli and procedures.
The stimuli used in study four were the same as those used in study three, except that participants were not randomized to receive a genetic explanation or no genetic explanation for Jane's behaviour. Thus, the study employed a 6 (situation) × 2 (condition: antisocial versus prosocial) fully randomized, between-subjects design. After participants read their assigned vignette, they were posed two new questions before being asked to rate their genetic attributions for Jane's behaviour using the same scale employed in study three. One was a responsibility rating, for which they were asked 'To what extent to do you believe Jane is responsible for her patterns of behaviour that you just read about?' and provided their responses on a scale from '1 (Not at all)' to '7 (Very much). ' The other, a 'true self ' rating, asked 'To what extent do you think Jane's patterns of behaviour that you just read about reflect who she truly is?' with participants again providing their responses on a scale from '1 (Not at all)' to '7 (Very much). ' The genetic attribution rating appeared below the two mediator ratings in the onscreen procedures, as measuring mediators before measuring outcome variables has been advocated as the preferred temporal sequence for mediation analyses 48 . See Supplementary Table 2 for the full stimuli used in study four.
Study five. The methods for study five attempted to address some potential limitations of the methods used in studies one to four. In particular, in studies one to four, the prosocial and antisocial behaviours about which participants read took the form of vignettes that we created for the purpose of this research. Because the stimuli were not pretested and might be seen as somewhat idiosyncratic, it is possible that they did not manipulate the prosocial/antisocial distinction as intended, that precise experimental control was not achieved or additional variables were manipulated in unforeseen ways. While this appears unlikely given the consistent results of studies one to four, across which a variety of stimuli were used, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, because the vignettes in studies one to four described specific behaviours, it is possible that the asymmetry observed so far occurs for the specific behaviours described in these vignettes but not more widely. By contrast, study five used broad descriptions of 'Jane' to depict her as either prosocial or antisocial.
Participants. Because study five had only two between-subjects conditions, like study one, we aimed to recruit a sample similar in size to the one used for study one. Participants were 260 adults recruited via MTurk (36.5% male, 62.7% female, 0.8% other gender or preferring not to answer).
Stimuli and procedures. Participants in the prosocial condition (n = 130) were told, 'Jane has a strong tendency to be kind, generous, and caring toward others. She often goes out of her way to treat people well and help them. ' By contrast, those in the antisocial condition (n = 130) were told, 'Jane has a strong tendency to be mean, selfish, and uncaring toward others. She often goes out of her way to mistreat people and take advantage of them. ' Participants were given no other information about Jane and were asked, 'How much of a role do you think genetics play in Jane's behaviour?'; they provided their responses on the same scale used in studies one to four. See Supplementary Table 4 for the full stimuli used in study five.
Study six. Study six, testing whether the asymmetry would occur when serious criminal behaviour was compared with strongly prosocial actions, used completely novel vignettes that had not been employed as stimuli in the previous studies, so we aimed to be more conservative in specifying our sample size, choosing to recruit a larger number of participants per condition than for studies one to five. We also chose to use a different recruitment method than the one used for studies one to five, to enhance the external validity of the findings by examining whether the same pattern of results would emerge in a non-MTurk sample.
Participants. Participants in study six were recruited by Qualtrics, which offers participant recruitment services for a fee, in addition to providing the online datacollection software used for all of the present research. Qualtrics assembled a panel of 686 adult members of the US population to complete the study procedures in the form of an online survey. These participants were 43.9% male, 55.7% female, and 0.4% unknown or unspecified gender. They received compensation equivalent to approximately US$6.40 (consistent with standard pay rates used by Qualtrics Panels) via Qualtrics Panels' e-reward system, in which individuals can choose whether to receive their compensation in the form of a gift card, a voucher for free goods/services (for example, free movie tickets), or points that can be pooled across surveys and then exchanged for a larger reward (for example, a more valuable gift card).
Stimuli and procedures. Study six used a 2 (character: Michael versus Nick) × 2 (condition: criminal versus prosocial) fully between-subjects design. Participants assigned to the prosocial condition read a vignette describing an incident in which their assigned character rescued another person from falling victim to a violent crime, whereas those in the criminal condition read a vignette describing an incident in which their assigned character was the perpetrator of a violent crime. The specifics of the crime in question and the events described in the vignette varied depending on the character to which the participant had been assigned.
Similar to studies three and four, in which participants were told that the behaviour they had read about was 'consistent with how Jane usually behaves, ' participants in study six were told that Michael/Nick had 'a long history of consistently behaving the way he did during this incident. ' As in studies three and four, this information was included because we reasoned that a genetic explanation might befit a pattern of behaviour more readily than one specific action. After reading their assigned vignette, participants were asked, 'How much of a role do you think genetics have played in Michael/Nick's behaviour?' and rated their answers on the same scale used in the earlier studies. See Supplementary Table 5 for the full stimuli used in study six.
Data analysis.
Data analysis for all studies was performed using SPSS Statistics Version 25. Two-tailed tests were used for analyses. Data distribution was assumed to be normal, but this was not formally tested. No standalone custom code was produced to perform the data analyses. Data analysis was not performed blind to the conditions of the experiments. No participants were excluded from analyses.
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Study description
Six randomized quantitative experiments.
Research sample
All studies included male and female American adults (>18 years of age), residing within the United States. Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk for Studies 1-5, and through Qualtrics Panels (Qualtrics Research Services) for Study 6 .
Sampling strategy
All studies aimed to achieve a minimum power of .80, based on effect size estimates drawn from pilot studies or from studies reported earlier in the manuscript. In some cases, larger samples were recruited to be conservative (e.g., when new variables or stimulia were introduced). Samples were drawn from pre-existing online respondent pools (i.e., they were convenience samples, although the methods used involved randomized experiments). More detail is reported in the text.
Data collection
Data collection for all studies was conducted online using Qualtrics.com survey software. Investigators were blinded to group allocation during data collection in the sense that randomization to experimental conditions was done automatically by the computerized datacollection software. Participants participated in the research online, using their own devices (no experimenter present). 
